So. Kodak. It got to the point where it would have been more surprising if the firm hadn't filed for Chapter 11, such was the overwhelming inevitability of this move.
The iconic nature of the Kodak brand, forever associated with film-based photography and that 'Kodak moment' (now rewritten after this week's events as 'the end of that Kodak moment') has of course resulted in acres of end-of-an-era coverage after the firm's bankruptcy filing.
Far cleverer people than I have commented extensively about what went wrong at Kodak. Some believe that the rapid decline of its once-hugely profitable film business was such a fundamental shift that it was simply impossible to grow, or indeed buy, a new money-making replacement. However, this thought-provoking piece from The Economist contrasting the fortunes of Fujifilm and Kodak (written before the Chapter 11 filing) shows that it is possible for huge companies to adapt to huge changes in their markets. Kodak didn't do this quickly, or effectively enough.
Kodak's management over the past couple of decades have also come in for some stick. Since 2005 former HP man Antonio Perez has been the man at the top. He appointed a raft of HP colleagues to senior roles, proving at least one thing: a bunch of ex-HP people does not HP make.
What next? It seems that the Chapter 11 process will continue for at least a year, maybe more. Kodak's international operations are, technically, not affected. Not least because the local equivalents of Chapter 11 would all be different. But of course the rest of the Kodak world will, ultimately, be affected by how it restructures.
I've listened to Antonio Perez's statement on the Chapter 11 filing and looked at the accompanying documents . Unsurprisingly there's a positive spin on the whole thing ("Much like a number of successful US companies before us, Kodak will use the Chapter 11 process to achieve important goals...").
One of those goals will be to eliminate or reduce legacy issues, and the $800m promised to its UK pension scheme over the next decade is one such issue, as are the benefits currently being paid to retirees in the States ("the company will be examining these costs and, as necessary, will seek to adjust them").
Kodak intends to rake in funds by pursuing its intellectual property rights, as evidenced by fresh claims against Samsung and Fujifilm, joining existing long-running actions against Apple and RIM ("when it comes to intellectual property assets we have seen certain key industry players following a litigation strategy of delay, and this has resulted in Kodak not being paid what it was rightfully owed"). And it will now be able to sell off its 'spare' patents, too.
It's also possible the new-shape Kodak that emerges from all of this will be a graphic arts company. Perez talks of a future where Kodak will be "competing in large markets where we have fundamental technology advantages, such as digital printing, packaging, functional printing..." with no mention at all of the group's consumer offerings.
The $2.7bn turnover graphics wing is going to be the subject of considerable scrutiny, one way or another. As will the much-mooted Prosper inkjet technology on which Kodak has bet, and lost, so much thus far.
